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The hypothesis that economic freedom and related variables are significant determinants of
real per capita income and growth is critically evaluated. Economic freedom is found
necessary for higher levels of per capita income and growth largely in terms of threshold
effects as opposed to persistent marginal effects. More economic freedom does not appear to
yield higher levels of per capita income. And securing particular levels of economic freedom
does not guarantee higher levels of per capita income or growth. Secure private property
rights is found to be a most significant positive causal variable as is sound money, whereas
moderate amounts of labor regulation and big government are not found to be bad for the
economy. Also, good corporate governance, in addition to economic freedom, is of
considerable import. Unlike most studies, traditional statistical methods are supplemented by
graphical analysis in an effort to determine threshold values for economic freedom and its
components.
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1.  Introduction 
 
The focus of this paper is to critically evaluate the hypothesis that economic freedom is a significant 
causal variable in the determination of real per capita income. Although I do find that economic 
freedom is a necessary condition for the latter; this is largely in terms of threshold effects or critical 
values as opposed to persistent marginal effects. More and more economic freedom does not appear to 
yield higher levels of per capita income. Moreover, I find that the use of aggregate measures of 
economic freedom can generate misleading results given that they comprise different sub-indexes that 
do not always correlate in a similar fashion with per capita income. Of particular importance, the 
evidence suggests secure private property rights is a most significant positive causal variable, whereas 
the hypothesis that labor regulation and big government are bad for the realization of higher levels of 
real per capita income finds little empirical validation. Traditional statistical methods plus graphical 
analyses are used in this study. 
 
In some of the recent applied literature on economic growth and development, where institutional 
variables are given some consideration in the modeling process, a key independent variable is what is 
broadly referred to as economic freedom. This variable is considered to be proxy measure for secure 
private property rights, where the latter is critically important to the New Institutional Economics 
(NIE) along the lines pioneered by North (1990) and Olson (1996, 2000). A key argument put forth in 
NIE is that such rights provide the incentives for individual agents to behave in a fashion wherein the 
private and social rates of return are equalized. This minimizes the incentives for agents to engage in 
rent seeking behavior thereby encouraging behavior which would maximize per capita growth. Similar 
points have been articulated much earlier (and largely ignored) by Hayek who argued for the 
establishment of an environment where de-centralized planning can take place though individual 
agency thus making optimal use of one the scarcest of resources necessary to the organization and 
functioning of economic life—knowledge. Secure private property rights facilitates independent 
economic agents making allocative decisions in a world of continuously moving disequilibria and 
imperfect information given extant and changing relative product and factor prices (Hayak 1945, 1967, 
1989, 1991; see also Pipes 2000).  
 
Implicit in some of the NIE literature is the hypothesis that competitive markets force efficient 
institutional change in terms of ideal configurations of property rights and, more generally, economic 
freedom. The more competitive are the markets, the more efficient will be the economy, ceteris paribus 
(see Parente and Prescott 2000, for detailed and explicit narrative on this point; see also Leibenstein 
1966). Needless to say, making an economy more competitive is, itself, a function of institutional 
change. But given the state of competitiveness, the more secure are private property rights, the more 
efficient will the economy be. Thus, for the NIE, it is of considerable analytical importance to include 
a proxy for private property rights as an independent variable, irrespective of market structure, when 
testing for the importance of institutional variables for growth and development. In terms of theory and 
the causation, the NIE and econometricians testing the hypothesis that secure private property rights 
are critical, it is suggested that not only is this variable (and economic freedom writ large) a necessary 
condition for sustained per capita growth and economic development, but that the higher is the extent 
of secure property rights, the higher should be the level of real per capita income and per capita 
growth. It is implied that there is both a threshold effect and a marginal effect, where the latter is not 
subject to diminishing returns.  In fact, the standard econometric analyses do not test for threshold 
effects and focus on the marginal effects (slope coefficients) and pay most heed to statistical 
significance, which has nothing to do with either of these effects nor with economic significance 
(Ziliak and McCloskey 2004; see also Altman 2004c). 
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2. Economic Freedom Index 
 
Although secure private property rights is at the core of the NEI and the early Hayek, a typical and 
popular measure of economic freedom, the Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom Index (EFI), part of 
its Freedom of the World project (Fraser Institute 2007a) is an amalgam of indexes, only one 
component of which is a proxy for property rights.
1  The same is true of the Index of Economic 
Freedom (IEF) produced by the Heritage Foundation (Heritage Foundation 2007). These indexes are 
deemed to be of causal significance in affecting the level of per capita income. But given the nature of 
the aggregate index, EFI cannot test for the importance of secure private property rights per se. Nor 
can the IEF. Any identical aggregate index number across countries or for a given country over a set of 
years can have a different economic meaning if this index number is made up of different index 
numbers for its component parts. The index for secure private property rights might be either falling or 
rising as the aggregate index number for economic freedom increases or diminishes.  
 
Given its practical importance for research, I focus on the Fraser Institute’s EFI. But I also provide 
some comparative estimates derived from the Heritage Foundation’s data base. The EFI is comprised 
of sub-indexes for the following variables (the Heritage Foundation’s IEF is similarly constructed, but 
includes an additional index measuring the extent of corruption): 
 
1.  Size of Government: Expenditures, Taxes, and Enterprises (incorporating: general government 
consumption spending as a percentage of total consumption; transfers and subsidies as a 
percentage of GDP; government enterprises and investment; and top marginal income and 
payroll tax rates).  
2.  Legal Structure and Security of Property Rights (incorporating: judicial independence; 
impartial courts; protection of property rights; military interference in rule of law and the 
political process; integrity of the legal system; legal enforcement of contracts; and regulatory 
restrictions on the sale of real property). 
3.  Access to Sound Money (incorporating: money growth; standard deviation of inflation; 
inflation: most recent year; and freedom to own foreign currency bank accounts). 
4.  Freedom to Trade Internationally (incorporating: taxes on international trade; revenue from 
taxes on international trade as a percentage of exports and imports; mean tariff rate; standard 
deviation of tariff rates; non-tariff trade barriers; compliance cost of importing and exporting; 
size of the trade sector relative to expected; black-market exchange rates; international capital 
market controls; foreign ownership/investment restrictions; and capital controls). 
5.  Regulation of Credit, Labor, and Business (i. credit market regulations comprising: ownership 
of banks; foreign bank competition; private sector credit; interest rate; ii.  controls/negative real 
interest rates; ii. labor market regulations comprising: minimum wages; hiring and firing 
regulations; centralized collective bargaining; mandated cost of hiring; mandated cost of 
dismissing; conscription; and iii. business regulations comprising: price controls; administrative 
requirements; bureaucracy costs; starting a business; extra payments/bribes; licensing 
restrictions; cost of tax compliance). 
 
As a footnote to the empirical narrative below, it is important to observe that the Fraser Institute’s and 
the Heirtage Foundation’s perspective on the necessarily negative effects of minimum wages, unions, 
safety nets, and government (points 1 and 5 above), although very much part of the conventional 
wisdom is not universally adhered to. Labor market flexibility need not imply ‘cheap’ and weak labor. 
                                                 
1 See the Fraser Institute’s (2007b) Free the World link (http://www.freetheworld.com/papers.html) for 
a list peer reviewed papers using this Economic Freedom Index testing (and supporting the hypothesis) 
that economic freedom indeed is important to sustained economic growth and development.   3 
For example, Baumol, Litan, Schramm (2007, 7) write: “…the importance of flexible labor markets 
cannot be overstated: if entrepreneurs cannot attract new labor, they cannot grow, nor will they want to 
grow if labor rules are overly restrictive (especially if rules limit the ability of firms to fire 
nonperforming workers or shed workers they no longer need).” Flexibility is related to the capacity of 
entrepreneurs to adopt changes that allow their corporations to flourish—they can’t be forced to 
maintain workers if so doing will cause their firms long-term harm. Baumol, Litan, Schramm (2007, p. 
91) also maintain that a social safety net can be positive for the economy since it reduces the extent to 
which workers can be expected to resist entrepreneurial innovations which can be devastating to 
individual workers in the absence of a safety net. A safety net therefore has both efficiency and social 
justice dimensions attached to it.  Moreover, Lindert (1996) shows that state expenditure, so often 
inveighed against by many mainstream economists, need not negatively affect the economy. Its impact 
can even be quite positive. Much depends, as common sense would lead us to expect, on how funds are 
spent. Moreover, for the seeds of economic freedom to take root often requires government investment 
in public goods. In addition, there is a theoretical literature which suggests that cheap and weak labor 
can negatively impact of labor productivity and technological change whilst better-rewarded workers 
can have the opposite effect (Altman 1992, 1998, 2001, 2003, 2004a, 2004b, 2005, 2006, 2007).
2 
 
3. Economic Freedom and GDP 
 
3.1 Basic Empirical Results 
 
The empirical relationship between the EFI and its component indexes, and real per capita GDP 
(PCGDP) and per capita growth, is discussed in relation to Table 1 and Charts I to XV. Table 1 
presents estimates for correlation and slope coefficients. The charts provide a more revealing analysis 
of the relationship between economic freedom and PCGDP, which goes beyond the mere average 
relationships specified by regression analysis. It is here that threshold effects are discussed. I also 
speak to the possible importance of governance to the determination of PCGDP levels (Chart XVI). It 
is assumed that either levels or growth rates of per capita GDP is the dependent variable. All data are 
derived from the data bases of the United Nations’ Human Development Report (2006), the Fraser 
Institute’s Economic Freedom Index (Fraser Institute 2007a), the Heritage Foundation’s Index of 
Economic Freedom data base (Heritage Foundation (2007) and the World Bank’s governance 
(Kaufmann, Kraay, Mastruzzi, 2007) data bases. All charts employ the Fraser Institute data for 
economic freedom. Real PCGDP estimates are for 2004 in 2004 United States purchasing power parity 
equivalents. The sample size of 133 countries (Appendix 1) was determined by the EFI data base and 
its compatibility with the Human Development Report data on PCGDP and per annum PCGDP growth 
rates. I use annual real GDP per capita growth rates for the 1990-2004 period and rely on the 2004 
economic freedom estimates. Using the available data for the pervious few years would not affect my 
results.  
 
Some have questioned economists’ focus on the determination of per capita GDP. But the conventional 
wisdom perceives that this variable is an important proxy for socio-economic wellbeing. The HDI is an 
unweighted index of PCGDP, life expectancy, and education, where these component index numbers 
                                                 
2 This last point is in part inspired by x-efficiency and efficiency wage theory pioneered by Leibenstein 
(1966, 1979). Contrary to the conventional wisdom, I assume that the quality and quantity of effort on 
the part of workers, managers and owners is a variable input affected by the overall incentive 
environment. Moreover, changes in labor costs are shown to impact on the rate of technological 
change. Particular forms of labor regulation can here have possible positive effects on per capita 
income and growth. Under these assumptions it is possible that competitive markets do not suffice to 
induce efficient institutional change (on this point see Altman 2006).   4 
are scaled back at an increasing rate as one move towards the top of the scale. The HDI index is held to 
be, by many, a truer representation of wellbeing than PCGDP. However, the correlation (R
2) between 
PCGDP and the HDI ranking for 177 countries is 0.92. Chart I illustrates the tight relationship between 
these two variables. Clearly, per capita income matters substantively for a country’s HDI ranking.
3 
This especially the case if a nation is to move beyond the bottom 60 ranked economies, for whom this 
wide range of low rankings is consistent a narrow range of low PCGDPs. It is therefore possible to 
move up the bottom steps of the ladder of low-ranked countries with a given low level of per capita 
income largely through government policy making more effective use of scarce resources toward 
improvements in education and health; but beyond this per capita income must increase for socio-
economic wellbeing to improve. And, it is hypothesized that extended the breath and scope of 
economic freedom is vital to achieve this end. 
 
From Table 1 it is evident that there is a tight statistical relationship between economic freedom and 
PCGDP—a R
2 of 0.76. This is not, however, the case with all of the core components of the EFI. 
Sound Money and Freedom to Trade score in the high 0.50s whereas Economic Regulations, in the low 
0.50s; but the Size of Government is a negative 0.05. Also a key sub-component of Economic 
Regulation, Labor Market Regulations scores an R
2 of only 0.23. The tightest fit is between PCGDP 
and the Legal Structure and Protection of Property Rights, with an R
2 of 0.82, where the latter variable 
is the de facto core of the New Institutional Economics’ and of the early Hayek’s causal hypothesis 
positively relating economic freedom to growth and development. The slope coefficients for linear 
regressions of PCGDP as a function of the EFI and its components are mainly large. For the EFI, there 
is a slope value of almost $8,000. Every one point increase in the EFI, which ranges from 0 to 10, 
statistically yields a $8,000 increase in PCGDP. For economic growth and the EFI the R
2 is much 
lower at 0.36 and at a similar level for its sub-components except for Economic Regulations, which is 
at 0.22 and Size of Government, at 0.05.  Labor Market Regulation is only 0.03. Therefore, there is 
much more variation from the mean relationship when the dependant variable is economic growth. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that there is the ‘expected’ positive relationship between growth and economic 
freedom. The slope coefficient is almost 1.0; a one point increase in the EFI is correlated with a 0.9 
increase in the annual growth rate. Such growth would increase PCGDP by about 9 percent in ten 
years. But once again the relationship between Labor Regulations and economic freedom and Size of 
Government and Economic Freedom is a trivial one. The Heritage Foundation’s data yield similar 
results, but with even stronger negative results for government variables. Finally, both the Heritage 
Foundation’s Corruption Index and the World Bank’s Corporate Governance Index, which 
incorporates corruption, are very strongly and positively correlated with PCGDP, with large slope 
coefficients. This suggests that economic freedom itself, no matter how important, requires good 
corporate governance, if economic freedom is to facilitate sustained growth (Kaufmann 2003, 2005, 
2007).  
 
With regards to the slope coefficients that, for the EFI (and for the IEF), are economically significant 
for both PCGDP and growth, one must be wary about easily projecting, in a linear fashion, from 
changes in the EFI to changes in PCGDP. Graphical analysis suggests otherwise. It is also important to 
note that if one relates PCGDP to the marked increase in the EFI from 1990 to 2004, the R
2 is negative 
0.33 for a percentage change and negative 0.31 for an absolute change in economic freedom. The R
2 is 
negative 0.88 and 0.08 respectively for per capita growth rates. This tests the hypothesis that changes 
in the extent of economic freedom drives differences in PCGDP with a time lag. These basic results at 
least suggest that, on average, increasing the extent of economic freedom, in terms of the EFI, was not 
                                                 
3 See Davies and Quinlivan 2006 who discuss this tight relationship with international trade as the 
mediating variable between PCGDP and the HDI ranking.   5 
economically important during this time frame wherein much per capita growth actually took place. It 
also points to the possible importance of thresholds of economic freedom that must be realized for 
higher levels of per capita GDP to be realized. 
 
3.2 Threshold Effects 
 
The thresholds effects are more analytically nuanced than traditionally discussed coefficients. What the 
graphed data on the charts suggest is that particular thresholds of economic freedom need be passed for 
a wide array of per capita GDPs and growth rates to be achieved. The marginal effects intimated by the 
slope coefficients do not seem to be all that important. Moreover, the value of the correlation 
coefficient indicates the importance of each threshold value for achieving higher levels of income and 
growth. The higher the R
2, the greater the number of thresholds that need be passed—the more 
linearity there is in the statistical relationship between the dependent and independent variables. 
 
The EFI is scaled 0 to 10, with 10 representing the most economic freedom, where 10 is hypothesized 
to be the ideal by some scholars. With regards to the aggregate EFI and PCGDP (Chart II), an EFI of 5 
to 6 is consistent with a PCGDP of between $5,000 and $10,000.  Between $10,000 and $15,000 
correlate with an EFI of close to 7, while an EFI of between 7 and 8 correlate with PCGNPs greater 
than $15,000. Going above 8 is not required to generate ever higher levels of per capita income. 
Moreover, achieving an EFI of between 7 and 8 is also consistent with very low PCGDPs. Therefore, 
certain levels of economic freedom might be necessary to achieve particular levels of per capita 
income, but they are far from sufficient. This latter basic finding holds true for each of the EFI sub-
indexes. 
 
In terms of Legal Structure and the Protection of Property Rights (Chart III), an EFI sub-index of 4 to 5 
is associated with a PCGDP of between $5,000 and $10,000, while an EFI of 5 to 6 correlates with a 
PCGDP of between $10,000 and $15,000, although a few countries achieve per capita incomes that are 
even higher.  An EFI of 6 to 7 correlates best to PCGDPs of between $15,000 and $30,000. Higher per 
capita incomes require even greater protection of property rights and a more conducive legal system. 
Unlike the other sub-indexes, the property rights sub-index is characterized by some statistical 
linearities between itself and the level of per capita income. It is also the case that with an EFI sub-
index exceeding 7, PCGDP does not fall below some threshold—getting this sub-index high enough is 
correlated with the absence of low income economies. This is not the case for the aggregate EFI and 
most of the other sub-indexes.  
 
Economic Regulation (Chart IV) between 5 to 6 is most closely correlated with a PCGDP of $5,000 to 
$10,000. Between 6 and 7, per capita income spans to close to $30,000, but can also reach to well 
below $5,000. PCGDPs exceeding $30,000 is associated with an EFI sub-index of 7 to 8. However for 
the Labor Regulations (Chart V) component of the Economic Regulation sub-index, index numbers of 
between 4 and 5 are consistent with PCGDPs approaching $30,000, and between 5 and 6 correlate with 
the highest of per capita incomes. Apparently less and less labor regulation does not purchase ever 
higher levels of per capita income. At the same time even a minimum threshold of labor market de-
regulation is consistent with both very low and very high levels of PCGDP. 
 
An index number of 6 for the Sound Money (Chart VI) sub-index is the threshold for achieving 
between $5,000 and $10,000 PCGDP. However, one has to jump to a sub-index number of 8 to 9 to 
realize a PCGDP of $10,000 to $35,000. Moreover, most economies achieving PCGDPs above 
$20,000 are characterized by a Sound Money EFI of 9 to 10. The evidence suggests that it is unlikely 
that high per capita incomes can be achieved without realizing high thresholds for Sound Money. 
   6 
The Big Government (Chart VII) sub-index tells another tale. A sub-index of 4 to 5 is consistent with 
an array of PCGDPs ranging from the very low to close to $40,000. In addition, low to very high 
(indicating small government) sub-index numbers are all consistent with PCGDPS of  $5,000 or less. 
 
For the Freedom to Trade (Chart VIII) sub-index a threshold of 5 to 6 is consistent with per capita 
incomes of $5,000 to $10,000. Index numbers of 6 to 7 are consistent with PCGDPs of $10,000 and 
above, albeit many more countries are characterized by PCGDPs above $15,000 with index numbers of 
7 to 8. 
 
Turning ones attention to per capita growth (Chart IX), an EFI of less than 5 is only consistent with 
negative growth rates. Index numbers of 5 to 6 correlate with growth rates up to 2 percent per annum. 
Above 6, one has a wide range of growth rates from the very low to the very high. Therefore, 5 is a 
critical threshold for significant economic growth, where a 2 percent annual growth rate yields a 22 
percent increase in per capita income over 10 years. EFIs well below 10 correlate with growth rates 
ranging to 12 percent, albeit most of the very high growth rates economies are at about 4 percent, 
where the latter yields a 48 percent increase in PCGDP over 10 years. 
 
In terms of Property Rights (Chart X) sub-index, 4 (approximately) is a threshold for positive growth.  
Between 4 and 5 correlates with negative to high positive growth rates. Also, as this sub-index 
increases there are fewer economies with very low and negative growth rates. Nevertheless, growth 
rates of between 2 and 4 percent (which are actually quite high historically speaking), are consistent 
with sub-index numbers of 5 and above. 
 
Economic Regulation (Chart XI) sub-index numbers of 4 to 5 are consistent with negative to just above 
2 percent growth rates. But sub-index numbers of 5 to 6 correlate with negative to even higher positive 
growth rates, ranging to about 6 percent. Reducing economic regulation per se (increasing the sub-
index number) does not appear to yield more growth. With regards to the Labor Regulations (Chart 
XII) component of this sub-index, index numbers of 4 to 5 correlate with negative to positive 4 percent 
growth rates. A relatively low threshold need be met with regards to Labor Regulation to achieve fairly 
high rates of economic growth. Sub-index numbers of between 5 and 6 are consistent with growth rates 
ranging from the negative to well over 8 percent. As is true with the other Economic Freedom Indexes, 
realizing a threshold value is not sufficient to generate a particular rate of growth. 
 
A Sound Money (Chart XIII) sub-index number of 6 to 7 correlates best with growth rates ranging 
from the negative to about 6 percent. Increasing this sub-index number does little (statistically 
speaking) to generate more growth.  
 
A Government Size (Chart XIV) sub-index number of about 3.5 is consistent with growth rates ranging 
to about 2 percent. To locate many economies with growth rates above the 2 percent rate requires sub-
index numbers of 5 to 6. Also, between 4 and 5, one finds many more economies with growth rates 
ranging to 2 percent. One does not require (statistically speaking) smaller and smaller government to 
correlate with high rates of growth.  
 
With regards to Freedom to Trade (Chart XV), sub-index numbers of 5 to 6 correlate with growth rates 
ranging from the negative to about 4 percent. Lesser sub-index numbers correlate only with negative 
growth economies—with one exception, that of a near zero growth economy. Sub-index numbers of 6 
to 7 are associated with even higher growth rates. Once again, achieving a threshold index number 
appears to be necessary but not sufficient to generate the higher rates of economic growth. 
 
Finally, it is revealing to refer to Chart XVI, where the World Bank’s corporate governance index 
(CGI) is graphed against PCGDP. The former includes measures for illegal and legal corruption, public 
sector ethics, and judicial/legal effectiveness. The CGI is scaled from 0 to 100, with 100 being the best.   7 
A CGI of 20-30 is associated with $5,000 to $15,000 of PCGDP; $15,000 to $20,000 with a CGI of 
30-40; $20,000 to $25,000 with a CGI of 40-50; and above $25,000 with a CGI of greater than 60. 
Most high income economies are correlated with CGI numbers above 70, where one also finds no low 
income economies. There are some linearities associated with the CGI and PCGDP. Improving 
corporate governance, on the margin, appears to make a substantive difference. But, typically, 
achieving a particular level of corporate governance, does not guarantee the realization of a particular 
level of PCGDP. Needless to say, corporate governance appears to be of some importance in the 
determination of PCGDP. It is not at all clear that economic freedom without good corporate 
governance (in terms of appropriate thresholds) will suffice to facilitate the realization of high levels of 




At a most general level the evidence supports the hypothesis that Economic Freedom, as embodied in 
the Fraser Institute’s EFI, is economically important to the determination of per capita income. As the 
conventional wisdom would have it, there exists relatively large correlation coefficients with the ‘right’ 
sign and relatively large and substantive slope coefficients linking per capita income, per capita 
growth, and economic freedom. This is especially true of the EFI’s sub-indexes relating to property 
rights and sound money. There is much less support, if any, that labor market regulation and big 
government, as defined by the Fraser Institute as well as by the Heritage Foundation, apart from 
extreme levels, negatively impact per capita income. Indeed, this is consistent with research suggesting 
that free market economies benefit from properly administered quality doses of Big Government and 
Labor Regulation. Graphical analysis suggests that what is most important is the threshold values or 
minimum values of economic freedom (and that of its components) to realize particular levels of per 
capita income and growth. These values are typically moderate and far from the maximum value 10, 
with exception of Sound Money. The evidence supports the hypothesis that once these thresholds are 
met, further increases to economic freedom (or its components) do not appear necessary for the 
realization of further increases in per capita income and growth. There are clear exceptions to this. One 
is with regards to private property—affirming the long held Hayekian view of its vital import for 
economic growth.  
 
For more economies to move forward, typically different thresholds must be realized for the different 
sub-indexes of economic freedom. Yet, reaching and even surpassing such thresholds is shown not to 
be sufficient to realize higher levels of per capita income and growth. Therefore, although economic 
freedom is important to grow an economy, pursuing marginal increases in economic freedom past the 
threshold will not do the trick, especially if attention is directed to the wrong components. The level of 
economic freedom per se does not indicate if a particular economy has its economic freedom mix just 
right. It also seems to be the case that different economies at different and perhaps even at the same 
stage of development might require somewhat different mixes of the ingredients for economic 
freedom.
4 The estimates presented here are only suggestive of the thresholds values that need be met, 
in terms of economic freedom index numbers and their components. Moreover, for economies to grow, 
other variables (such as good corporate governance) must also be in place. And, the Economic 
Freedom Index, by its very nature, provides no information on whether these other necessary pieces in 
the growth puzzle are present and appropriately positioned. 
                                                 
4 An important point recently made by Rodrik (2007) is that one must appreciate that different 
economics might very well require different development strategies contingent upon local 
circumstances. But this need not distract from the notion that certain core fundamentals (such as 
threshold levels of economic freedom and good corporate governance) are universally necessary (but 
not sufficient) for sustainable development to transpire.   8 
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 Appendix 1
Economies Included n this Study (Fraser Insttute EFI Based)
1 Albania 35 Czech Republic 69 Kenya 103 Poland
2 Algeria 36 Denmark 70 Korea, Rep. of 104 Portugal
3 Angola 37 Dominican Republic 71 Kuwait 105 Romania
4 Argentina 38 Ecuador 72 Kyrgyzstan 106 Russian Federation
5 Armenia 39 Egypt 73 Latvia 107 Rwanda
6 Australia 40 El Salvador 74 Lesotho 108 Senegal
7 Austria 41 Estonia 75 Luxembourg 109 Sierra Leone
8 Azerbaijan 42 Ethiopia 76 Macedonia 110 Singapore
9 Bahamas 43 Fiji 77 Madagascar 111 Slovakia
10 Bahrain 44 Finland 78 Malawi 112 Slovenia
11 Bangladesh 45 France 79 Malaysia 113 South Africa
12 Belgium 46 Gabon 80 Mali 114 Spain
13 Belize 47 Georgia 81 Malta 115 Sri Lanka
14 Benin 48 Germany 82 Mauritania 116 Sweden
15 Bolivia 49 Ghana 83 Mauritius 117 Switzerland
16 Bosnia and Herzegovina 50 Greece 84 Mexico 118 Syrian Arab Republic
17 Botswana 51 Guatemala 85 Moldova 119 Tanzania,
18 Brazil 52 Guinea-Bissau 86 Mongolia 120 Thailand
19 Bulgaria 53 Guyana 87 Morocco 121 Trinidad and Tobago
20 Burkina Faso 54 Haiti 88 Mozambique 122 Tunisia
21 Burundi 55 Honduras 89 Namibia 123 Turkey
22 Cameroon 56 Hong Kong 90 Nepal 124 Uganda
23 Canada 57 Hungary 91 Netherlands 125 Ukraine
24 Central African Republic 58 Iceland 92 New Zealand 126 United Arab Emirates
25 Chad 59 India 93 Nicaragua 127 United Kingdom
26 Chile 60 Indonesia 94 Nigeria 128 United States
27 China 61 Iran 95 Norway 129 Uruguay
28 Colombia 62 Ireland 96 Oman 130 Venezuela
29 Congo 63 Israel 97 Pakistan 131 Viet Nam
30 Congo, Dem. Rep. of the 64 Italy 98 Panama 132 Zambia
31 Costa Rica 65 Jamaica 99 Papua New Guinea 133 Zimbabwe
32 Côte d'Ivoire 66 Japan 100 Paraguay
33 Croatia 67 Jordan 101 Peru
34 Cyprus 68 Kazakhstan 102 Philippines
Note: Luxenbourg is excluded from the Graphic analysis given its outlier status.Table I
Economic Freedom and Governance Correlation and Slope Coefficients
Independent Variable Dependant variable Dependant variable Dependant variable Dependant variable
GDP per capita Growth per annum GDP per capita   Growth per annum
Fraser Institute Heritage Foundation
Slope Correlation Slope Correlation Slope Correlation Slope Correlation
Economic Freedom (1990) $6,579 0.762 0.442 0.278
Economic Freedom (2005) $7,648 0.697 0.861 0.363 $7,521 0.705 0.624 0.280
      Property rights $5,084 0.823 0.471 0.353 $3,793 0.795 0.228 0.235
      Economic regulations $5,693 0.526 0.516 0.219 $4,306 0.669 0.294 0.221
            Labor regulations $2,199 0.233 0.064 0.032 $1,815 0.234 0.199 0.121
      Sound money $4,320 0.583 0.549 0.343 $3,755 0.373 0.534 0.260
      Financial $2,681 0.533 0.273 0.267
      Size of government -$411 -0.051 0.084 0.048 -$3,172 -0.512 -0.216 -0.172
      Fiscal -$3,791 -0.306 -0.259 -0.099
      Investment $3,309 0.572 0.292 0.246
      Freedom to trade $5,732 0.572 0.708 0.326 $3,985 0.442 0.274 0.152
      Corruption $4,020 0.844 0.258 0.266
Corporate governance $424 0.817 0.0126 0.131
Percentage change in
Economic Freedom Index -0.331 -0.883
(1990-2005)
Absolute change in
Economic Freedom Index -0.307 0.084
(1990-2005) 
 
  
  
 
  
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
  
 